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1 Introduction.
In the last two decades the economic policy of several developing countries has often been
characterized by perverse cycles of unsustainable policies and attempts at stabilization.
The pattern is generally some variant of a very simple one (see Bruno et al. (1991),
Dornbusch and Edwards (1989), and Sachs (1989) for informative descriptions). First,
government expenditure expands sharply, beyond any level that could reasonably be
sustained in the long run, causing large current account deficits and external debt accu-
mulation. After some time, these current account deficits can no longer be financed, and
the need for a drastic fiscal consolidation and stabilization becomes apparent. At this
time, everyone realizes how pervasive the costs of the stabilization and how persistent
the damages of the past policies are.
Why then do governments engage in such unsustainable policies, when everyone
can foresee their perverse effects? More generally, why do government often wait so
long before stabilizing an economy where some crucial policy variables are obviously
at unustainable levels? To an economist, these have always been uneasy questions,
because the observed behavior of the policymakers seems to clash with any hypothesis of
rationality on the part of the agents of the economy. Why should anyone that recognizes
the long-run costs of postponing a needed adjustment not act immediately to spread such
costs evenly over time? Indeed, the standard representative agent, textbook model of
an open economy implies that consumption should be smoothed over time, by running
current account deficits when production is below its permanent level, and surpluses
when production is above normal.
It has long been recognized that delays in stabilizations can be explained in a way
that is not inconsistent with individual rationality, provided one is willing to drop the
assumptions of a representative agent and of a benevolent government that maximizes
some social utility. Several recent contributions have formalized this basic idea by view-
ing delays in stabilization as the result of the interaction of two groups, each trying to
minimize its share in the costs of the adjustment.
In Alesina and Drazen (1991), each group is imperfectly informed on the costs of the
adjustment to the other group. Thus, the two groups engage in a "war of attrition",
each trying to wear out the opponent until it concedes. At some point, the group that
stands to lose the most from a further postponment, concedes, and agrees to bear the
larger part of the costs of stabilization. In Laban and Sturzenegger (1995), each group's
costs of a stabilization are known to their opponent. However, the two groups differ in
their ability to adapt to the economic environment; for instance, financial adaptation
allows the rich to avoid many of the costs of inflation, while at the same time it increases
the costs of inflation and therefore the cost of not stabilizing to the poor. When this
process has gone far enough, the best strategy for the poor is to agree to measures that
stop inflation and stabilize the economy in a way that is particularly costly to them.
In a similar vein, Velasco (1993) views episodes of unsustainable policies as a "common
pool" problem. Fiscal policy is expansionary and debt accumulates because the two
groups regard fiscal resources as a common pool and do not fully internalize the costs
of financing government expenditure. However, as debt accumulates, the costs of this
non-cooperative equilibrium increase, until eventually both groups agree to revert to a
more responsible fiscal stance.
A common feature to all these models is that delays in stabilization are the result
of the interaction of two groups. A stabilization occurs because the incentives to accept
a disproportionate share of its costs evolve differently over time for the two groups.
However, as Drake (1982), Haggard (1991) and Nelson (1989) - among others - have
shown, the making and shifting of coalitions between different groups is often crucial in
understanding these episodes. In particular, Dornbusch and Edwards (1989) and Sachs
(1989) have documented how the expansions associated with the initial phases of populist
experiences drew wide approval from both unions and the associations of industrialists,
because of the temporary increase in real wages and profitability that they afforded. The
experience of Peru in 1985-88 provides an illustration of the process described above. In
1986, one year after the start of his populist policies, the approval rating of Alan Garcia
reached 90% (Sachs (189), p. 23). Indeed, at the beginning "...the success [of the Alan
Garcia experiment was] broadly based because the recovery of demand can raise firms'
profitability by raising capacity utilization. A year after the program started Garcia was
celebrated by the business class for the success of his recovery strategy." (Dornbusch and
Edwards (1989), p.38).
The boost to domestic demand is typically brought about via a drastic expansion
in fiscal policy, particularly on transfer programs. These are often justified as ways of
addressing income distribution issues that are perceived as particularly pressing. Thus
"in all these [populist] experiments, governments have explicitly argued that the policies
are necessary to correct glaring inequalities in the income distribution, and to raise the
living standards of the poor" (Sachs (1989)).
The other side of this government induced expansion is a quick accumulation of
external debt, or, equivalently, a delay in repaying an existing debt. Once again, Peru
provides a stark illustration of this point. Soon after taking office, Alan Garcia limited
external debt service to 10% of exports. According to Dornbusch and Edwards (1989), p.
37, this was "the most widely noted measure of the Garcia government... The policy of
limiting debt service was not only an essential step on the political front. It effectively
suspended the external constraint. With the foreign exchange savings resulting from
limited debt service, a widening of the trade deficit became possible. Thus external
constraints on growth...were suspended. "
Of course, this type of expansion cannot last for long. After a certain point the
external constraint cannot be overcome and a drastic reduction in demand becomes
unavoidable. This induces a dramatic shift in coalitions: the business sector on one side
and the unions and the poor on the other are no longer on the same side. The reason is
that richer individuals, who in general own more mobile factors, can largely escape the
costs of the adjustment, "...when everything is said and done, the real wage will have
declined massively, to a level significantly lower than when the whole episode began...
The extremity of the real wage decline is due to a simple fact: capital is mobile across
borders, but labor is not." (Dornbusch and Edwards (1989), p. 7).
Thus, in the end the expansionary fiscal policies unravel and the alliance between low-
income individuals who benefit from redistribution, workers and industrialists, breaks
apart. The present model aims at capturing, in a simple and stylized way, these features
of the process described above. In the model, different coalitions form and change
depending on the position of three groups over the degree of redistribution and the
timing of debt repayment.
The logical structure of the model is very simple. A country is populated by individ-
uals belonging to three different income classes. They must decide, by majority voting,
how much of a given external debt to repay in each of two periods. In a representative
agent world, exactly half of the debt would be repaid in each period, so as to smooth
consumption perfectly over time. This is also the outcome in the economy studied here
when the per capita income is high enough, and in a poor economy with an equal dis-
tribution of income. In all these cases the position of the "middle class" prevails, and
the economy behaves like a representative agent economy, by spreading the cost of the
adjustment over the two periods.
When the economy is poor and has a highly unequal distribution of income, however,
the repayment of the debt is postponed entirely to the second period. Importantly, both
the very rich and the very poor agents of this economy have an incentive to postpone
stabilization. The former because they are mobile in the long run, and therefore can
avoid paying the costs of stabilization by waiting; the latter because by postponing the
repayment of the debt they can enjoy more redistribution of income in the first period,
while no redistribution will be possible anyway in the second period because of the polit-
ical process. Thus, in a poor economy the pattern of income distribution has important
consequences for the timing of stabilizations. This last feature is consistent with the
evidence presented in Berg and Sachs (1988), who show that developing countries with
more unequal distribution of income tend to accumulate larger external debts.
The outline of the paper is as follows. The next section presents the model. Section
3 briefly illustrates the solution in the case of no income dispersion. Sections 4 and 5
present the solution for the case of a rich and a poor economy, respectively. Section 6
concludes.
2 The model.
The model incorporates in a stylized way the four key features described above that give
rise to the cycles of "populist experiences" and stabilization: the forming and shifting of
coalitions between different groups, the role of endogenous, redistributive fiscal policy,
the accumulation and repayment of external debt, and the mobility of some factors.
1. Technology and preferences.
The economy lasts two periods, 1 and 2, and produces a single good with a linear
production function using labor only: y = On, where n denotes the amount of labor and
9 is a technological shift factor.
The utility function is of the form U{clic2) = u(ci) + u(c2), where Cj represents
consumption in period j . The function u[x) is bounded from below when x = 0. Without
this assumption, an agent would be indifferent between two consumption profiles, each
implying 0 consumption in at least one of the two periods, even if total consumption is
higher under one profile than the other. Since 0 consumption in the second period does
occur for certain agents under some circumstances, this assumption ensures that these
agents still have a preference ordering over different consumption profiles.
A utility function with these characteristics is the Constant Relative Risk Aversion
utility function:
1-7 1 -
1 — 7 1 — 7
with 7, the inverse of the elasticity of intertemporal substitution, less than 1.
Note that, for simplicity, the rate of time preference is assumed to be equal to 0.
2. Income distribution.
The economy is populated by a total mass 1 of agents, divided into three groups, A,
B, and C. For convenience, each group has mass 1/3. Each member of group i is
endowed with n; units of labor, with UA < TIB < nc- The average labor endowment,
(TLA + riB + nc) /3 , is normalized to 1. Thus, if the price of the only good is normalized
at 1, Orti is also the income of an agents of type i.
In solving the model, in some situations the possibility of a tie when voting on two
proposals arises because each proposal receives the votes of one group, while the third
group abstains or does not vote. To break these ties, I assume that group B has a
mass infinitesimally larger than 1/3. This assumption has the realistic implication that
the "middle class" is larger than the two extreme classes, or that at least it has more
political clout.
Also, to capture in a simple but effective way the role of redistributive issues, I assume
that the poor, group A, have no labor income at all: UA = 0. Thus, the members of this
group must rely exclusively on redistribution for their consumption. Group A therefore
represents those important parts of the population whose main stake in fiscal policy is
to maximize redistribution.
Note that under this assumption, given the average endowment h the values of nc
and 71B necessarily move in opposite directions. Moreover, it is easy to verify that an
increase in nc is unambigously associated with an increase in inequality, such as the Gini
coefficient or a mean-preserving spread. In particular, I will distinguish between "high
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inequality", when n# < 1, and "low inequality", when n# > 1. For future reference,
note that, when n# < 1, nc varies between 2 and 3, and when n# > 1, nc ranges from
3/2 to 2.
3. Fiscal policy.
Fiscal policy consists of a single redistributive program. In period j , all individuals are
taxed at a proportional rate tj\ the tax revenues thus collected are then redistributed
lump-sum among all agents. Note that, although the tax rate is proportional, the tax
cum subsidy system is progressive.
This type of fiscal policy implies that, at any positive tax rate, an individual with
above-average endowment pays in taxes more than he receives in subsidy, and therefore
always prefers the lowest possible tax rate. By contrast, an individual with below-average
endowment always benefits from redistribution, and prefres the maximum possible tax
rate, 1.
Note that in this framework, the optimal tax rate for any individual is either 0 or 1,
with a discontinuity at the average endowment. This feature of the model is a conse-
quence of the simplicity of the setup, where taxation does not cause any distortion. It
could be easily eliminated by, for instance, assuming that taxation induces distortions
that are increasing in the tax rate, as in an earlier version of this paper.
4. Debt repayment.
The economy begins in the first period with a given outstanding foreign debt, D. By
the end of the second period, this debt must be completely repaid. The amount repaid
in period j is denoted by Rj. In each period, the debt is repaid by drawing on the tax
revenues collected in that period; the remaining tax revenues are redistributed lump-
sum. For future reference, the tax rate that raises an amount of tax revenues just equal
to Rj is denoted by t(Rj).
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The country is shut off from further external borrowing. This assumption is made
only in order to simplify the analysis and to focus on the main point of this paper.
Perotti (1994) analyses the case where official borrowing and lending are allowed. Also,
private individuals cannot borrow or lend. Clearly, if private individuals could borrow
and lend freely at the going interest rate, they could undo, partially or totally, the
effects of official flows by generating private flows in the opposite direction. However, in
most of the countries whose experience is being captured in this model, there were some
restrictions on private capital flows. If these controls had some effectiveness, then private
agents could no longer undo completely the effects of official policies. The assumption
made here can therefore be considered as an extreme case of capital controls. Moreover,
Perotti (1994) shows that, even if private agents could have access to the world credit
market, the model would still generate interesting, and realistic, outcomes, such as a
two-way flow of resources, with private flows going in opposite direction to official flows.
For simplicity, the interest rate per period, like the rate of time preference, is as-
sumed to be equal to 0. This implies that there is no consumption-smoothing motive
for postponing the debt repayment: under this assumption, a standard model of a small
open economy would predict that a representative agent would maximize utility by re-
paying half of the debt in each period (e.g. Dornbusch (1983), Sachs(1982)). Thus, in
this model a "delay in stabilization" occurs when less than half the debt is repaid in the
first period, so that the bulk of the repayment occurs in the second period.
5. The political system.
In each period, the tax rate tj is decided by majority voting. In the first period, all
individuals also vote on the amount Ri of the existing debt D that must be repaid.
Clearly, in the second period the only policy variable that must be decided by majority
voting is the tax rate t2, since the amount to be repaid in the second period, i?2, is
determined residually as R2 = D — R\.
Note that in this framework the issue space is bidimensional in period 1. As it is
well known, in general the existence of a non-cycling majority cannot be guaranteed in
this case. In this model, a non-cycling majority exists. The reason is that there are
only three types of agents, and the proposals that can be voted on are the policies that
maximize the utility of each type of agent. This ensures that there is always a finite
number of proposals, which in turn ensures the existence of a stable winner. Notice that
a necessary and sufficient condition for a proposal to be the stable winner, is to defeat
the other two in pairwise comparison.
In what follows, I assume that the initial debt is such that it can be repaid all in the
second period. This assumption, which will be formalized precisely in the next section,
ensures that it is possible to postpone the whole adjustment to the second period. I will
denote with Dmax the maximum value of the debt that satisfies this requirement.
6. Mobility.
Finally, individuals are mobile in the long run. Specifically, in the second period an
individual can move abroad, where he earns an income 7it-, i = A,B,C. Thus, 9 can
be interpreted as an index of the level of development of the home country: a value
of 9 greater than 1 means than the home country is more productive that the foreign
country, and conversely when 9 is less than 1. To be able to use the foreign technology,
an individual must pay a cost d\ hence, his consumption if he moves abroad is rii — d.
As a convenient simplification, I assume that d is equal to the average endowment of
labor of the home economy, 1. Hence, only those individuals with endowment at least
as large as the average endowment will be able to pay the cost d and move abroad.1
In summary, an individual moves abroad in period 2 if:
<K(1 - t2) + t2e -R2<nt-l (2)
In fact, the first term on the LHS represents his labor income, net of taxes; the second
1
 Nothing substantial depends on this assumption.
term represents tax revenues (equal to the tax rate times the average income of the
economy), that are redistributed lump-sum after deducting the third term, i.e. the debt
repayment R2. Thus, the LHS represents the consumption of the individual in period
2. The RHS of 2 represents his consumption if he moves abroad.
This completes the description of the model. Although it is extremely simple and
stylized, the interaction of majority voting with labor mobility gives rise to a rich dy-
namics. The next section starts by studying the benchmark case of the representative
version of this economy.
3 The representative agent economy.
To highlight the role of the distribution of income, it is interesting to start from the study
of an economy identical to that described above, except that there is no dispersion in
the distribution of income, so the all individuals have a labor endowment of 1.
In fact, the representative agent version of the model has a very standard solution.
Because all individuals have an endowment of labor equal to the cost of moving abroad,
their consumption if they leave is always 0. Obviously, nobody leaves in period 2. Hence,
with an interest rate equal to the rate of time preference, the utility of a representative
agent is maximized when consumption is smoothed perfectly across the two periods.
This is achieved by repaying exactly half of the debt in each period: R1 = R2 = D/2.2
The representative agent version of the model therefore displays exactly the behavior
predicted by standard models of a rational, forward-looking utility maximizer: the costs
of stabilization are spread equally over the two periods. This highlights the key role of
income dispersion in generating delays in stabilization in this model.
2Note also that a representative agent is indifferent to any tax rate: when pre-tax income is equal
to the average, an agent always pays in taxes what he receives in subsidy, whatever the tax rate is.
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4 A rich economy.
When the distribution of income is non-degenerate, and despite the simplicity of the
setup, there are a large number of cases in this model, depending on the level of de-
velopment of the economy, captured by 0, on the pattern of the distribution of income,
and on the initial value of the debt, D. To avoid a tedious list of all possible cases, I
will illustrate the two extreme cases of a very rich (0 > 2) and a very poor (0 < 1/2)
economy, which are all one needs to capture the main idea of the model.
The key characteristic of a rich economy is that for all initial levels of debt agents
C will remain in period 2, regardless of the distribution of income. Given this, it is
intuitive that a majority of agents will maximize their utility under a policy of perfect
consumption smoothing, i.e. by repaying exactly half of the debt in each period.
To see all this formally, it is useful to consider two cases, depending on whether the
agents with median income, agents B, have more or less than the average income.
1. Low inequality: n# > 1.
Suppose initially that in period 2 both groups B and C stay. Since they have above-
average labor endowments, both dislike taxation, and in each period they propose the
lowest possible tax rate. In period j , this is the tax rate that is strictly necessary to
raise Rj in tax revenues, t(Rj). Also, given that all agents are present in the economy
in period 2, clearly the utility of both agents B and C is maximized when consumption
is smoothed perfectly. Thus, both agents B and C propose to repay half of the debt in
each period, i.e. they propose R\ = R2 = D/2 and /1 = £2 = t(D/2). Because it has the
support of both groups, this proposal wins.
It only remains to show that indeed both groups B and C will be present in the
economy in period 2. To show this, note first that the only stable Nash equilibria
involve either all agents of the same group leaving or all staying (see Appendix 1 for
a formal proof). Given this, suppose first that all agents C have left, and recall that
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by assumption the debt must be such that it can be repaid all in the second period.
If agents B stay, and all debt D is repaid in period 2, their consumption in period 2
is BUB — 3D. If agents B leave, their consumption is n# — 1. Let DB/AB denote the
maximum debt that agents B are willing to repay rather than leaving the country once
agents C have left, i.e. when only agents A and B are present. Therefore, DBIAB is
denned by:
0nB - WB/AB = nB-l (3)
Now suppose all agents are present in the economy. The maximum debt that can be
repaid in period 2 without forcing agents C to leave, J}C'ABC, is defined by:
Onc{\-t{DclABC)) = nc-l (4)
It is easy to show that, for 0 > 2, DC/ABC > DB'AB: in other words, if D > DCIABC
so that agents C leave, necessarily D > DB/AB and agents B would leave, too. But
then no positive debt could be repaid, and therefore any debt D greater than ]JC/ABC
is impossible.
Similarly, following the previous notation, let DB/ABC indicate the debt at which
agents B are indifferent between staying and leaving if all agents are present, and DCIAC
the debt at which agents C are indifferent if agents B have left. It is easy to show
that DB/ABC > DC/AC. Thus, D cannot be greater than DB/ABC, because at that debt
agents B would leave, but then agents C would also leave. Again, nobody would remain
to repay the debt.
The above reasoning implies that, if agents B leave, agents C leave too, and viceversa.
The maximum debt must therefore be such that both agents B and C stay if all debt is
repaid in the second period, i.e. Dmax = rnin(DB/ABC, DC/ABC). Because agents C are
richer than agents B, they have more to lose from taxation, and therefore leave at lower
levels of debt than agents B. Thus, DCIABC < DBIABC', and Dmax = DC'ABC. This
implies that under any temporal profile of debt repayment, all agents will be present in
the economy.
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In summary, letting Ez- denote the proposal by agents i in period 1, the proposals of
the three groups are:
Agents A: SA: tx = I, R1 = 0;3
Agents B: £#: tx = t(D/2), Rt = D/2;
Agents C: Ec: tx = t(D/2), #1 = D/2;
Clearly, the proposals of agents B and C win a majority of votes in period 1. Half of the
debt is repaid in each period, and the consumption of each agent is smoothed perfectly,
exactly as in a representative agent economy.
2. High inequality: ng < 1.
The basic difference with the previous case is that now agents B have a below-average
endowment of labor. Thus, if agents C are present in period 2, the equilibrium tax rate
will certainly be 1 in both periods, as both groups A and B vote for it.
As before, suppose that indeed agents C are present in period 2. Given this, agents
A and B can smooth consumption perfectly and maximize utility by proposing a tax
rate of 1 and by repaying half of the debt in each period. Hence, both groups propose
t1 = t2 = 1, R\ = R2 = D/2. With the support of two groups, this proposal obviously
prevails, and again the debt repayment is spread equally over the two periods.
To show that indeed agents C stay in period 2, note that agents B now cannot leave
in period 2 because their labor endowment is below 1. Therefore, if all agents C leave,
the maximum debt that can be repaid is equal to the aggregate income of agents B:
jjB/AB __ QnBl% On the other hand, if all agents C stay, the tax rate is 1 and their
income in period 2 is 6 — R2. Hence, the maximum debt that can be repaid in period 2
3Because their endowment is below the average, in period 1 agents A propose the maximum possible
tax rate, 1. Also, agents A anticipate that in period 2 the tax rate that will prevail in equilibrium will
be the minimum tax rate necessary to repay R2; therefore, there will be no redistribution of income in
period 2, and the consumption of agents A will be 0 independently of the value of R2. Given this, it is
obviously optimal for agents A to propose R\ = 0, so as to maximize consumption in period 1. Under
this proposal, they consume 6 in period 1 and 0 in period 2.
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before agents C leave, £)CIABC ^ is now denned by:
9 - DC'ABC = nc - 1 (5)
For 6 > 2, it is easy to show that £)C/ABC > DBIAB, like in the case of low inequality.
Thus, Dmax = J)CIABC5 which implies that all agents C certainly stay in period 2.
To summarize, the proposals of the three groups are:
Agents A: E^: tx = \,R-l = D/2;
Agents B: £#: h = 1, #i = D/2;
Agents C: E c : tx = t(R°), Rl = R° > D/2;4
Clearly, the proposals of agents A and B win a majority of votes in period 1. Although
now the winning coalition is different, reflecting the different distribution of income, the
path of aggregate consumption and income for the whole economy is the same as in the
case of high inequality. Both aggregate consumption and the consumption of each indi-
vidual are smoothed perfectly, and the costs of the stabilization are distributed equally
across the two periods.5
5 A poor economy.
Consider now a very poor economy, with 0 < 1/2. Because the economy is so poor, all
agents C will leave when inequality is high, i.e. when ng < 1, even if the equilibrium
tax rate were 0 and there were no debt to repay. In fact, when 9 < 1/2, One < nc — 1
whenever nc > 2, i.e. whenever n# < 1.
4or any given Ri, in period 1 agents C propose i(-Ri); under this proposal, since in period 2 the
equilibrium tax rate will be 1, their consumption would be higher in period 1 than in period 2 if half
of the debt were repaid in each period. Therefore, they propose a value of R\ that is larger than D/2.
5The pattern of individual consumptions is different, though, as a consequence of the different tax
policies adopted. In particular, now all agents consume the same amount, since the tax rate is 1.
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An important implication is that agents A will always favor postponing the adjust-
ment entirely to period 2. In fact, when inequality is low (n# > 1), both groups B and C
(if they stay) have above-average endowments and therefore oppose any redistribution
of income in period 2. When inequality is high (rig < 1), as seen above agents C will
certainly leave, and again agents B will oppose any redistribution of income in period
2. Given this, the best strategy for agent A is to try and maximize redistribution in the
only period when it is possible, i.e. in period 1. Thus, agents A always propose t\ = 1
and Ri = 0 in period 1.
If some other group too agrees on postponing the repayment entirely to the second
period, a majority of individuals support this policy. The other group that can agree to
postoponing the adjustment entirely to the second period is group C. In fact, contrary to
the case of a rich economy, now it is possible that DB^AB > ]JC/ABC: in other words, it
is possible for agents C to leave and agents B to stay. If agents C indeed want to leave,
then they will propose to postpone the adjustment to the second period, so that the
entire cost will be borne by agents B. The remaining part of this section shows precisely
that, in equilibrium, this can occur in highly unequal societies.
1. Low inequality: ng > 1.
A complete treatment of this case requires an analysis of several subcases, depending
on the pattern of income distribution. However, the outcome of all these subcases is
always the same, namely that the proposal of agents B always prevails, and the economy
spreads the repayment of the debt between the two periods. Only the main intuition
will be presented here, while the complete formal analysis is left to Appendix 2.
Note first that, because rc_g > 1, the tax rate in period 2 will be the minimum
required to repay the debt. In fact, regardless of whether agents C are present or not, a
majority of agents have above-average endowments, and therefore dislike any taxation
beyond what is strictly necessary to repay the debt.
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When nc is relatively low (close to the lower bound 3/2), ±DB/AB < £)C/ABC. Hence,
if the debt repayment is spread equally between the two periods, agents C will stay.
Agents B can therefore smooth consumption perfectly by proposing R1 = R2 = D/2
and t\ = t2 — t(D/2). If agents C stay, they maximize utility by smoothing consumption
equally between the two periods, and therefore they too propose Ri = R2 = D/2 and
ti = t2 = t(D/2). If they leave in period 2, clearly they maximize utility by letting all
the debt be repaid in period 2, when they have left; therefore, in this case they propose
Ri = 0 and t\ = 0.6 As shown above, agents A propose t\ — 1, R1 = 0. It is relatively
easy to show that B's proposal defeats the other two in pairwise comparison. In fact,
B's proposal defeats A's proposal because agents C always prefer B's proposal to the
high tax rate in A's proposal. Agents A are indifferent between B's and C's proposals,
since they get nothing under either; hence, B's proposal defeats C's proposal.7
When nc is high, \DB/AB > DC/ABC. Hence, at high levels of debt it might impossi-
ble for agents B to smooth consumption perfectly: if D/2 > J)GIABG
 ? agents C will leave
in period 2 if D/2 is repaid in each period. Thus, agents B propose R\ = D — £)C/ABC
and R2 = £)cfABC5 and t\ = t(Ri), t2 = t(R2), so that agents C stay in period 2. Again,
B's proposal defeats the other two in pairwise comparison, for the same reasons as above.
The proposals of the various groups in period 1 can be summarized as follows:
Agents A: Y>A: ^  = 1, ^ = 0;
Agents B: ZB: tx = t(RB), Rx = D/2 or Rt = D - DCIABC > D/2;
Agents C: X^: t1 = 0,R1=0 or tx = t(D/2), R1 = D/2.
As shown above, B's proposal always wins in period 1. Thus, when inequality is low, a
poor country acts like a rich country, repaying half of the debt in each period, or it can
even slightly frontload the cost of the adjustment, by repaying more than half the debt
6Note that this last case can occur only if DBIAB > DCIABC.
7Recall the ti-breaking assumption that group B is infinitesimally larger than the others, which




Although both groups A and C might be in favor of delaying the repayment of the
debt, they disagree strongly on the tax policy. Because the difference over the tax pol-
icy is so radical, this issue is more important than any agreement they might have over
the timing of the debt repayment. Therefore, the proposal of the middle class is adopted.
2. High inequality: TIB < 1.
The main difference with the previous case is that now not only agents A, but even
agents B vote for a tax rate equal to 1 in period 1. This causes a crucial shift in
alliances: now agents C prefer A's proposal over B's proposal because the two have
the same tax rate, 1, but at least the former postpones the adjustment entirely to the
second period, exactly as in C's proposal. This creates a winning coalition in favor of
postponing the adjustment, composed of groups A and C.
More formally, note that now agents C certainly leave in period 2, because ns < 1
implies nc > 2, and for these high values of nc the maximum consumption agents C
that can achieve, One, (when the tax rate is 0 and there is no debt to repay), is less
than what they can consume abroad, nc — 1. Thus, agents C propose t\ = 0, R\ = 0.
Knowing that agents C will not be present in period 2, agents B will try to smooth
consumption by proposing a larger repayment in period 1 than in period 2, so that
agents C can be called on to contribute to the repayment in the only period when they
are present. Hence, agents B propose t\ = 1 and Ri > D/2. Finally, agents A know
that there will not be any redistribution in period 2, independently of the size of the
repayment; hence, they want to maximize their consumption in period 1, by postponing
all the adjustment to period 2, and propose t\ = 1, and Ri — 0.
The following are therefore the proposals of the various groups in period 1:
Agents A: EA: tx = 1, Rx = 0;
Agents B: £ B : h = 1, Ri > D/2-
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Agents C: E c : tx = 0, ^  = 0;
and it is easy to see that the proposal of group A defeats the other two in pairwise
comparison. In fact, A's proposal defeats B's proposal: both imply the same tax rate,
but the former allows agents C a higher consumption in period 1 by setting R\ at 0.
A's proposal also defeats C's proposal, as agents B prefer the tax rate of the former,
while it has the same debt repayment as the latter. Thus, A's proposal beats the other
two proposals in pairwise comparison, and it is adopted. When inequality is high, a
coalition of groups A and C, the two groups at the opposite extremes of the distribution
of income, is in favor of a complete delay in stabilization. The proposal of the middle
class is defeated, and all the costs of the stabilization are postponed to the second period.
This feature of the model captures two important empirical regularities that were
pointed out in section 1. First, it is often poor, unequal societies that have accumulated
large external debts in the 70's and 80's (see Berg and Sachs (1988). Second, the
main political support for budget deficits and accumulation of external lies mainly in a
coalition of workers, low-income individuals, and the associations of industrialists.
6 Discussion and conclusions.
This paper has provided a politico-economic framework for the analysis of the phe-
nomenon of delays in stabilization. Unlike the existing literature, it explicitly allows for
the formation and shifting of coalitions between groups on the basis of their positions
over the fiscal policy stance, a phenomenon that seems to be at the heart of many recent
experiences of delays in stabilization. In the model, a delay in stabilization occurs when
a coalition of individuals at the opposite extremes of the distributon of income an initial
expansionary fiscal policy. When the time of debt repayment comes, the interests of the
two groups diverge drastically and the coalition breaks apart. Importantly, however, the
two groups support the initial policy of delaying the stabilization in the full knowledge
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that their interest will differ in the future. Thus, the outcome is fully consistent with
individual rationality and perfect foresight.
Also, in the model a delay in stabilization occurs only in poor, unequal economies,
a feature that seems to be consistent with a number of empirical studies.
From a more technical viewpoint, in this model individuals vote repeatedly over two
issues. Despite this, the existence of a non-cycling majority is obtained here by virtue
of two features of the model. First, all agents of the economy belong to a discrete (and
small) number of classes. Second, only the preferred policies of each class are admissible
proposals. This framework might prove useful for future research in the growing body
of political economy, where the need to constrain voting to one issue has often proved
to be particularly limiting in models that try to capture in a realistic way interactions
between economic and political phenomena. As the paper show, interesting "coalitions"
might emerge from this framework, where in particular the policy of the "median" voter
is defeated.
Many aspects of the typical experience of delay in stabilization are bound to be
missing from such a stylized model as used here. For instance, all monetary aspects, in
particular the role of monetization of the initial deficits, are completely absent. However,
the focus of the model is on distributive aspects and the related political process leading




This Appendix proves formally that in a rich economy with low inequality (i.e., with
9 > 2 and n# > 1), the only stable Nash equilibria involve either all agents of a given
group staying or all leaving. To see this, note first that the tax rate in period 2 is either
t(R2), the tax rate required to repay exactly R2, if the mass of agents B and C that
stay is a majority; or 1, if the majority is composed of agents A. In both cases, the
consumption of agents C decreases as the mass of agents C that leave increases, since
the cost of repayment has to be spread over fewer agents. Thus, the consumption of an
agent C who stays, 9nc(l — t(R2)) (when t2 = t(R2)) or 9 — R2 (when t2 = 1), decreases
as the mass of agents C who leave increases. Similar considerations apply to agents B.
For some parameter values and for some values of R2 all agents C staying and all
leaving may both be Nash equilibria. However, in this case they would be Pareto-ranked:
in the former, the consumption of agents C would be 9nc(l — t(R2)) > UQ — 1, in the
latter, it would be nc — 1. Similarly, the consumption of agents B would be higher in
the former equilibrium than in the latter. To avoid dealing with problems of multiple
equilibria, that are not the focus of this paper, I assumethat in these cases the Pareto-
superior equilibrium is selected. Thus, whenever 9ric(l — t{R2)) > UQ — 1, all agents C
stay; when this inequality is reversed, all agents C leave.8 Similar considerations apply
to agents B.
Appendix 2.
This Appendix proves that, in a poor economy with low inequality (i.e., with 9 < 1/2
and n_g > 1), the proposal of agents B always wins.
First, as shown at the beginning of section 5, it is clear that agents A always propose
8Note that there might be a third Nash equilibrium, with a mass of agents C staying such that those
who stay consume exactly nc — 1. However, unlike the other two, this third equilibrium is unstable. In
addition, it is still Pareto-inferior to the equilibrium with all agents C staying.
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R\ = 0 and ta = 1. The proposals of agents B and C are slightly more complex. It is
useful to consider two separate cases:
Case 1: \DB'AB < DC'ABC.
The distinctive feature of this case is that it is possible for agents B to repay half of
the debt in each period while at the same time reatining all agents C in period 2. This
means that, if t\ = t2 = t(D/2) and Ri = R2 = D/2: all agents stay and consumption
is perfectly smoothed. Clearly, the utility of agents B is maximized under this proposal.
Agents C can make one of two proposals, depending on the value of the parameters.
First, their utility could be maximized under the same proposal as agents B, ti = t2 —
t(D/2) and Ri = R2 = D/2. Alternatively, agents C might be better off leaving in period
2, in which case they would propose ^ = 0, R\ = 0, thus postponing the adjustment to
the second period.9
If agents C make the first proposal, clearly it wins because it has the support of both
agents B and C. If they make the second proposal, B's proposal still wins. In fact, when
voting on B's and C's proposals, agents A are indifferent between the two and abstain;
therefore, B's proposal wins. When voting on A's and B's proposal, agents C prefer the
latter. In fact, under the former their lifetime income is 6 -f nc ~ 15 under the latter,
0nc(l —t(D/2)). It is relatively easy to show that the latter is larger than the former.10
Since, in addition, consumption is perfectly smoothed under the latter, clearly it gives
a higher utility.
Case 2: \DB?AB >
Now it might be impossible for agents B to smooth consumption perfectly, because at
9Note that this second proposal can occur only if, at the maximum debt, agents C leave in period
2, i.e. if Dmax = DB'AB > DCIABC.
10To see this, notice that nc < 1/(1 — theta), since this case arises only if One > nc — 1, or,
equivalent!^ DC<ABC > 0.
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high levels of debt D/2 is such that agents C leave in period 2. It is then easy to see that
the optimal proposal for agents B is to repay in period 2 the maximum amount that
is consistent with agents C staying, and the rest in period 1. Thus, if D/2 > J)C/ABC
agents B propose R1 = D - DCIABC, R2 = DCIABC, and tx = t(i?i), t2 = t(R2)-
In the same situation D/2 > DCIABC', clearly it is impossible for agents C to smooth
consumption perfectly, because at R2 = D/2 they would leave. Therefore, their utility
is maximized at ti = 0, Ri = 0. Although both agents A and C propose to postpone the
repayment completely, however, still B's proposal wins. In fact, under both A's and B's
proposal agents C consume nc — 1 in period 2. However, their consumption in period
1 is higher under B's proposal. Also, as usual agents A abstain between B's and C's
proposals, and the former wins.
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